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Why does a hegemon abruptly transition its stance toward certain powers from cooperation to confrontation? Using the example of U.S.-China and U.S.-Japan relations, I argue that, for a hegemon, changing state dispositions are not predominantly about military strength, ideology, nor adherence to global norms. Instead, drawing upon prospect theory, I suggest an economic and behavioral reasoning. I argue the United States’ contradictory actions are better understood as decisions made following transitions from a “domain of gain” to a “domain of loss,” spurred by economic disruptions to the status quo. To test this assertion, I use the synthetic control method to simulate a counterfactual path for China and Japan – their expected outcome had they never reached key economic thresholds. I find that the 35 to 40 percent range of proportional GDP relative to the United States coincides with a significant increase in negative sentiment, across different measures. This suggests there are important psychological considerations influencing state behavior, factors which traditional theories of international relations overlook.